Kentucky Lawyer Faces 6-Month Contempt Sentence For Obeying The Law

Amelia Mikki Adams, a Louisville, Kentucky, lawyer, received a 6-month contempt sentence for refusing to reveal the name of her minor client to a judge. Adams represented "J.J.," a 17-year-old female, who sought judicial approval of her decision to have an abortion.

According to Supreme Court precedent, states can require minors to obtain parental consent prior to having abortions. These states, however, must provide a "judicial bypass" option for mature minors to seek an abortion without parental consent.

During the bypass hearing, J.J "testified that her parents drink to the point of intoxication every day, leaving her and a younger sister to make their own meals and take care of themselves. . . ." The judge ruled that she was mature enough to have an abortion without parental consent.

Later the judge demanded that Adams reveal J.J's name, saying that she wanted to report the parents for child neglect. Adams refused because Kentucky law allows for anonymous bypass hearings and because ethical rules for attorneys prohibit attorneys from disclosing confidential client information. Although state law requires persons to report suspected incidents of child neglect or abuse, the law contains an exception for abuse learned of through an attorney-client relationship.

After the judge continued pressing for the information, Adams told the judge that she only knew her client's first name. Adams, however, immediately withdrew this comment, stating that she misspoke. The judge, however, later sentenced Adams to 6 months of incarceration for misleading the court and for failing to reveal J.J.'s name. The contempt ruling is currently under appeal, and the judge has stayed the contempt ruling pending appeal.

My Take

While Adams was wrong if she intentionally mislead the judge, the judge's request seems to violate Kentucky's bypass statute and its attorney ethical rules (which are similar across the nation). This alone would probably provide a basis for the appeals court to reverse the contempt ruling.

Improper Procedure Finding Contempt?

There is another possible angle that the appeals court could consider, but which media accounts have ignored. There a several kinds of contempt -- coercive and compensatory civil contempt and criminal contempt. Furthermore, contempt can be direct, or in the presence of the court, or indirect, taking place outside of court.

If a court imposes imprisonment or a fine under circumstances where the individual has no way to avoid the penalty, this constitutes criminal contempt. Contrast this with the situation where the court imposes a daily fine or jail term in order to coerce compliance with its orders (coercive civil contempt).

Supreme Court precedent requires courts to extend more due process to persons charged with criminal contempt. Although Kentucky law and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit summary proceedings for direct criminal contempt, these rules exist to prevent disruption to the legal proceeding. Although the facts of this case are unclear, it seems that the proceeding was virtually over and the court had already rendered its decision when the judge found Adams in contempt.

Under circumstances such as these, it is unclear whether a summary proceeding without notice or a hearing is permissible. As the Supreme Court held in UAW v. Bagwell, the leading case on this issue:

Summary adjudication becomes less justifiable once a court leaves the realm of immediately sanctioned, petty direct contempts. If a court delays punishing a direct contempt until the completion of trial, for example, due process requires that the contemnor's rights to notice and a hearing be respected. There "it is much more difficult to argue that action without notice or hearing of any kind is necessary to preserve order and enable [the court] to proceed with its business. . . ." Direct contempts also cannot be punished with serious criminal penalties absent the full protections of a criminal jury trial (italics added).

Because the facts surrounding the contempt ruling are not thoroughly reported in press accounts, it is unclear at this point whether the Kentucky judge complied with Supreme Court doctrine. Adams could also argue that the 6-month sentence constitutes a serious penalty under the circumstances. Regardless, Adams has a great basis for an appeal, given the weight of law that leans to her side.

UPDATE: This article was edited for clarity.

"Don't Mess With Texas!": Dancing Coach Jailed for Teaching the Cha Cha

A Texas judge sentenced a dance instructor to a 30-day sentence for violating a court order that enjoined him from teaching dance classes within 25 miles of his former place of employment -- the Arthur Murray Dance Studios in Plano, Texas (a Dallas suburb). This case involved a very standard contract dispute. The former employer argued that the instructor, Eric Rush, violated the terms of a "non-compete" clause in his employment contract, by competing for the dance company's client-base. According to an article in the Dallas Morning News, the court held that Rush violated the agreement by "creating a Web site advertising his work, posting Craigslist notices offering his services and contacting Arthur Murray students." The court ruled for the employer and ordered Rush to "to discontinue any Web sites, quit soliciting Arthur Murray customers and refrain from working with area dance studios until the end of 2009." Rush apparently violated the injunction by teaching the "cha cha" to a client at another local dance company.



My take: Non-compete clauses are standard fair, but many courts and employee advocates believe they can go too far in restraining the liberty of workers. Several states will refuse to enforce the clauses if they are unreasonable as to scope or duration. I have not seen the particular contract, so it is impossible for me to analyze it thoroughly, but based on the news articles, it seemed reasonable enough -- at least on the apparent requirement that Rush not solicit clients of his former employer. That's the essence of non-competition.



But even if the contract itself were reasonable, the court's injunction and its contempt ruling might go too far. Restraining internet usage raises First Amendment issues and basic concerns with practicality. Even if the 25-mile restriction is a fair reading of the contract (or even an explicit term in the contract), preventing Rush from advertising on the web probably makes it nearly impossible for Rush to establish an independent client base, not to mention a client base that does not live within the geographic scope of the injunction.



The 30-day jail sentence for contempt seems a bit over-the-top as well. Many judges would have simply fined Rush. Perhaps the court could have required him to turn over the proceeds he earned while violating the injunction. The stakes just do not seem high enough to warrant such a harsh penalty. I am inclined to agree with Rush's lawyer who analogizes the sentence to "killing a fly with a bazooka." But as a former Texas resident, I remember seeing sentences that seemed excessive to me quite frequently -- thus proving the old saying: "Don't Mess With Texas" (which actually originated as a slogan for an anti-littering campaign, not a statement of raw Texas toughness).



[Hutchinson: Sorry, I am now guilty of using the slightly misleading headline technique, but I hope you enjoyed reading the essay.]