Showing posts with label death penalty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label death penalty. Show all posts

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Focus On Ohio Death Penalty Drug Misses The Point -- Terribly

The Washington Post and other media have reported that Ohio has become the first state to execute an inmate using a single drug protocol. Most states use a "three-drug cocktail: sodium thiopental to render the condemned unconscious, pancuronium bromide to paralyze the prisoner and potassium chloride to stop the heart."

In January, the lone manufacturer of sodium thiopental abandoned making the product. Ohio has now decided to utilize pentobarbital, a drug that is commonly used to euthanize animals.

Ohio's use of pentobarbital has sparked a debate. Death penalty opponents contend that Ohio should seek more information regarding the use of the drug in humans. Death penalty advocates, however, argue that opponents are simply seizing upon this issue in order to wage their broader campaign against the death penalty.

Behind this warfare, however, is a more critical story. This story concerns Johnnie Baston, the man who was executed. The Toledo Blade, a local Ohio newspaper, focuses on more important issue surrounding the execution in an article analyzing Baston's execution. The TB article discusses the emotions the deceased and his family expressed at the moment of execution. It also reports that the family members of the victim pleaded with the state not to execute Baston.

This article places emphasis on more central issues concerning the death penalty, rather than on the search for a more "humane" way for state governments to murder people. The humanity of the people impacted by the state's killing are central to, but often ignored, in debates regarding the death penalty. The TB article, however, fills this void and even includes a long excerpt of Baston's last words:
I would like to say to my family I am very sorry. I know this is not what they wanted to have happen. I hope they won’t be too bothered by what is taking place today.

It is not their doing. Just the way things go.

I hope my execution, that it will be the last, that people will open up. The victims in my case didn’t want me to be executed. They wanted life without parole. That should have been respected. That should have been respected by our governor ...

I made a bad decision and I hope my family can move on and find some comfort and peace. I would like to say I’m sorry to my family. I made a bad decision.

I want you to reach out to my children. I love them so much. I want you to tell them stories about me. I want them to know the good things about me, even through my time in prison I wanted to better myself, encourage others. Remind them of that. My daughter, she’s quiet, a lot like me. Just like me.
I want you to watch her. If she talks, listen.

I want to thank all the members of my church, my friends who petitioned, letters, faxed, Twittered, hopefully, to the governor, to show mercy.

For a long time I didn’t see a lot of value in myself. It wasn’t until this moment till I had to go through this ordeal that I have seen so much love from so many people. Letters from people all over the world, and even Ohio.

I appreciate every last letter, I appreciate every last card, every last prayer, every last encouragement.

I was hoping I didn’t cry.

Dear heavenly father, I have sinned, and I repent of my sins, I pray for forgiveness. As I close my eyes on the light of this world, I hope to open my eyes to the light in heaven.
Too often, people in the US try to sanitize the use of the death penalty. It is an execution, not murder. The events are not televised. Usually, little, if anything, about the inmate's or the family's emotions are revealed. This article provides a welcoming human side to this process.

Wednesday, August 19, 2009

I'll Take the "Wise Latina" Over Two "Death Panelists"

People who opposed the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court often cited her discussion of race, gender and judging. Although Sotmayor's analysis of this issue was tentative and layered, critics assailed her for suggesting that a "Wise Latina" would analyze issues better than other judges.

After less than one week on the bench, I definitely prefer the Wise Latina to Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Thomas, who are clearly vying for positions on the imaginary "Death Panels" that the Obama administration is supposedly creating. In two recent death penalty cases, Scalia and Thomas voted against the inmates and in favor of execution. Sotomayor only voted in one case -- joining the liberal dissenters and voting for a stay of execution. The Supreme Court split in the cases, with a majority voting for the inmate in one case and against the inmate in the other.

The Troy Davis Case
The Justices gave more analysis in the Troy Davis appeal. In the Davis case, the Court ordered the trial judge to give Davis -- a Georgia black man convicted of killing a police officer -- the opportunity to present newly discovered evidence that was unavailable at the time of his trial. Davis argues that this evidence would prove his innocence.

Since the time Davis was convicted, most of the lead prosecution witnesses, including several individuals who identified Davis as the shooter, have recanted. Several of them assert that another prosecution witness, who was at the scene of the crime and who identified Davis as the killer, was in fact the shooter.

The Davis case has attracted the attention of many powerful individuals, including Jimmy Carter, Pope Benedict XVI, and former prosecutors and judges -- who believe Davis should have the opportunity to present newly discovered evidence that establishes his innocence.

We Do Not Care If You Are Actually Innocent: You Must Die
Justice Scalia and Thomas disagree with Davis and his supporters. Scalia's characteristically passionate dissent in the case makes him look like a bloodthirsty reaper. Scalia's dissent (in which Thomas joins) contends that even if Davis could establish his "actual innocence," this would not create a basis for a federal court to prevent his execution.

Scalia contends that federal statutory law would preclude any relief for Davis, even if he established his innocence. Accordingly, he concludes that ordering the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing is foolish.

But as Justice Stevens argues, the statute cannot trump a constitutional violation. I suspect that several of the justices believe that knowingly executing a person who has sufficiently established his innocence would violate the constitution.

This Is Not Scalia's First Execution-Hungry Statement
This is not the first time that Scalia has expressed callousness towards a person facing execution. In McCleskey v Kemp, another Georgia case involving a black man convicted of killing a police officer, Scalia sided with the majority, which held that McCleskey failed to show that race impacted his own sentence. A study of the Georgia death penalty, however, made a strong case that race impacted the general application of capital punishment in Georgia (see prior blog posts here, here, and here).

Although the majority held that McCleskey failed to show racial discrimination in his particular case, during the Court's deliberation, Scalia sent a memorandum to the other justices that contained a shocking argument. Scalia conceded that juries and prosecutors make decisions based on race and that he did not need any more "proof" in McCleskey's case.

Scalia, however, argued that racism among jurors and prosecutors was "ineradicable." In other words, Scalia described racism as a natural part of the criminal justice system that courts could not end -- or, presumably, even remedy. Although I agree that racism is a serious problem in the criminal justice system, I also believe that courts have a constitutional obligation to remedy it.

PS: I never heard any conservatives reconcile their support of Scalia with their dislike of Sotomayor due to her vote against the Ricci plaintiffs. Voting against a party seeking a promotion is one thing; voting to send someone to the death chamber -- while conceding that race mattered -- epitomizes injustice.

Update: In the original post, I inadvertantly omitted a link to Scalia's dissent. I have updated the post to provide a link to the opinion -- which you can read here: Scalia's Dissent in Davis.

Thursday, June 11, 2009

Rosen Writes on Race and Sotomayor

Jeffrey Rosen's first analysis of Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor sparked very heated responses. I described his article as a "hatchet job," and many other bloggers and media joined the fray. Rosen subsequently distanced himself from the original essay.

Now, Rosen has shifted gears -- mirroring a evolving approach by Republicans who oppose Sotomayor. Rosen's latest work on Sotomayor analyzes her views on "race" and "gender," rather than her purported intellectual shortcomings and temperament. In a Time article, "Where Sonia Sotomayor Really Stands on Race," Rosen primarily examines matters that have already received a tremendous amount of airplay. For example, he discusses the Second Circuit ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano, a speech Sotomayor delivered at the University of California at Berkeley, and a SCOTUS blog analysis of the numerous race cases Sotomayor has decided. Based on this review, Rosen concludes that:
An examination of Sotomayor's career supports the idea that on the bench, she has been a racial moderate, not a radical. At the same time, her opinions and speeches suggest that her views about race, multiculturalism and identity politics are more nuanced, complex and provocative than either her critics or her supporters have allowed. And for that reason, if confirmed, she could influence the racially charged issues the Supreme Court will confront over the next few decades in unexpected ways.
I agree with this conclusion. Nothing in the cases Sotomayor has decided or the speeches she has delivered suggests that she is a radical on issues of race. Instead, Sotomayor exhibits nuance -- a claim I made weeks ago after reviewing the entirety of her Berkeley talk. Accordingly, I am glad to see Rosen approach the issue with the complexity that Sotomayor (and the public) deserves.

One-Sided Analysis of O'Connor and Ginsburg Position on Gender
Despite my general approval of his new article, there are a few moments where Rosen's analysis lacks depth. For example, Rosen, like many other commentators, cites quotations by Justice Ginsburg and Justice O'Connor which suggest that these two women view gender as irrelevant to judging and to law. Rosen's use of these comments, however, distorts the complexity of Ginsburg's and Sotomayor's views on the subject of identity and judging.

As I have argued several times on this blog, Ginsburg and O'Connor have made statements in judicial opinions that contradict the "gender neutral" quotations that Sotomayor's detractors frequently cite. For example, in J.E.B. v. Alabama, Justice O'Connor agreed that prosecutors could not use peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on sex. O'Connor, however, wrote separately to emphasize that gender remains relevant in law:
We know that like race, gender matters. . . . [O]ne need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the case. . . .Individuals are not expected to ignore as jurors what they know as men--or women. . . .

[T]o say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact. I previously have said [the same thing about race]. . . .Though we gain much from this [ruling], we cannot ignore what we lose. [W]e have added an additional burden to the state and federal trial process, taken a step closer to eliminating the peremptory challenge, and diminished the ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate gender based assumptions about juror attitudes.
O'Connor also urged the Court not to extend J.E.B. to private lawyers because she wanted them to have the opportunity to maximize the number of women on juries for cases raising issues such as sexual harassment.

Furthermore, in Grutter v. Bollinger, O'Connor wrote the lead opinion which held that the University of Michigan law school had a compelling reason for wanting racial diversity: enhancing "viewpoint" diversity and the robust exchange of ideas in the classroom. O'Connor's opinions in J.E.B. and Grutter discredit the idea that she does not believe that race and sex matter. Rosen and others who continue to hold O'Connor (and Ginsburg) out as women who discount gender's relevance have failed to interrogate arguments that undermine their simplistic portrayals (on Ginsburg, see: Sotomayor's Opponents Apply Racial and Gendered Double-Standard).

Analysis of Death Penalty and Race
Rosen also contends that Sotomayor's position on race and the death penalty could impact future caselaw. Apparently, Sotomayor linked the death penalty with racism while she was a prosecutor for the State of New York. Rosen asserts that: "The court rejected that claim in 1987, but Sotomayor might be sympathetic to it." This statement, however, simplifies the Court's highly criticized 1987 ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp (which I have discussed on this blog). In McCleskey, a closely divided (5-4) Court rejected the petitioner's argument that Georgia applied the death penalty in a racially discriminatory fashion. Even if the "sophisticated" statistical analysis McCleskey introduced into evidence proved a racial correlation, he did not show in his own case that race mattered, nor could he demonstrate that Georgia maintained the death penalty because it wanted the racial patterns to occur.

Four justices, however, dissented from the majority opinion. Also, after he retired, Justice Powell, who wrote the majority ruling, listed McCleskey as a decision he "regretted." If Powell had changed his mind earlier, a majority of the Court would have concluded that racism impacted application of the Georgia death penalty.

Rosen should also consider the position of Justice Scalia, who voted with the majority in McCleskey. Although he sided with Georgia, Scalia wrote a memorandum to the other justices prior to the ruling in which he conceded that jurors and prosecutors operate on arbitrary biases like race. Scalia, however, says that this fact is "ineradicable," and he votes to reject McCleskey's claim -- despite his own statement that he needs no additional "proof" regarding the operation of race among jurors and prosecutors. If Scalia had voted in a manner that followed the logic of his memorandum and if Powell had changed his mind earlier, then a 6-3 majority would have agreed with Sotomayor. Brennan and Marshall, who dissented, opposed the death penalty altogether.

Sotomayor's feelings about the death penalty are not extraordinary, relative to the views of other justices. Much of the analysis of Sotomayor, however, decontextualizes her comments by failing to consider the breadth of her work and by failing to consider strikingly similar commentary by other judges.

Finally, the weight of academic literature, government studies, and even Supreme Court rulings on the death penalty supports Sotomayor's conclusion. In 1990, the General Accounting Office conducted an extensive analysis of existing studies on the death penalty. After eliminating unreliable studies and controlling for nonracial factors, the GAO found a pervasive pattern of race-based application of the death penalty -- particularly in the instance of a white victim. This bias sends more whites than blacks to the death chambers (because most murders are intraracial), but it legitimizes Sotomayor's view of the death penalty. The most racist aspect of the death penalty is the lack of empathy for black murder victims. McCleskey's study showed the same pattern.

Between 1930 and the early 1970s, almost 90 percent of the individuals executed for rape were black men, and all of the victims were white. This number is unexplainable on grounds other than race, particularly given the intraracial nature of rape. The Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty for rape in 1977, on the grounds that it was a disproportionate punishment for a crime that fell short of murder. Nevertheless, in other cases, members of the Court have cited to the race and rape statistics in order to contest the lawfulness of the death penalty.

Although Rosen's latest effort on Sotomayor improves upon his initial analysis, he fails to offer sufficient context in some places. Alas, he is certainly not alone on this issue.

Thursday, April 30, 2009

Is Justice Scalia an "Irresponsible" Judge?

Justice Scalia tends to irritate many people when he visits law schools. Several years ago, a student at NYU Law School infamously (but cleverly) asked Justice Scalia whether he and his wife engaged in a particular sex act. Scalia predictably responded that this was a private matter. The student responded by noting the glaring disparity between Scalia's desire to keep his own sex life private and his rulings excluding sexual conduct from the right of privacy.

Now, a professor has gone after Scalia. It all began when Scalia, appearing at a conference on digital privacy, made comments dismissing privacy concerns related to web-based information as "silly." Scalia also downplayed complaints regarding Internet "tracking," arguing that "I don't find that particularly offensive . . . I don't find it a secret what I buy, unless it's shameful."

In response, Professor Joel Reidenberg, who teaches information privacy at Fordham Law School, required his students to compile information concerning Scalia. The 15-page report contains information regarding Scalia's "home address, the value of his home, his home phone number, the movies he likes, his food preferences, his wife's personal e-mail address, and 'photos of his lovely grandchildren.'"

Scalia, however, has responded in his normally caustic, yet witty, style:

I stand by my remark at the Institute of American and Talmudic Law conference that it is silly to think that every single datum about my life is private. I was referring, of course, to whether every single datum about my life deserves privacy protection in law.

It is not a rare phenomenon that what is legal may also be quite irresponsible. That appears in the First Amendment context all the time. What can be said often should not be said. Prof. Reidenberg's exercise is an example of perfectly legal, abominably poor judgment. Since he was not teaching a course in judgment, I presume he felt no responsibility to display any (boldface added).
Ouch.

Often, when I teach Scalia's opinions I find myself agreeing with his "social criticism" of the other justices. For example, he often accuses liberal justices of being driven by ideology or politics. Similarly, in his comments concerning Reidenberg, he accuses the professor of exercising "abominably poor judgment." I am always troubled, however, that Scalia never turns his blade inward to examine how his own jurisprudence responds to politics and personal ideology. In this moment, I cannot resist the opportunity to use Scalia's words to evaluate his own judging.

Scalia has made the unassailable point that what is "perfectly legal" can also represent "abominably poor judgment." Applying that logic to judicial opinions, one could argue that a Court ruling (or individual Justice's opinion) can contain completely sound logic and fall within the reasonable range of outcomes -- yet still demonstrate an abominable level of judicial irresponsibility. Although there are several moments where I would argue that Scalia acted irresponsibly, the following analysis details perhaps his worst moment of recklessness:

Race and the Death Penalty
McCleskey v. Kemp involved an Equal Protection and Due Process challenge to the Georgia death penalty. A statistical study demonstrated a strong racial pattern in the imposition of capital punishment in Georgia. The racial pattern that most likely resulted in a death sentence involved a black defendant and a white victim. The Court rejected the petitioner's claim, arguing that he had not proven that he had suffered discrimination (even if others potentially had) or that Georgia maintained the death penalty "because of" the racial pattern that emerged.

Justice Scalia voted with the majority. Even though he joined the majority opinion which held that insufficient evidence of racism existed, Scalia nevertheless wrote a memorandum to the other justices prior to the ruling in which he concedes that juries and prosecutors make decisions based on race. Scalia, however, said that the law could not remedy this (which is almost a direct quote from Plessy v. Ferguson):

Since it is my view that the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable, I cannot say that all I need is more proof.
I would rank this as one of the most egregious examples of judicial irresponsibility. For a Justice of the Supreme Court to concede the operation of jury or prosecutorial racial bias but then pretend that the court is incompetent to remedy the situation when a person's life hangs in the balance is horribly irresponsible.

Ironically, Justice Scalia does not believe that the Court is incompetent to remedy "racial discrimination" when he votes to invalidate affirmative action policies. Nevertheless, the Court cannot change the scenario when the government is, under his own admission, killing someone due in part to racial bias. Highly irresponsible.